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context in which the right originated, a journalistic era characterized by
extreme callousness for the feelings of the individual, accounts for the
continued overzealous protection of an individual's privacy. Certainly,
continued adherence to the fact-fiction concept, unwillingness to recog-
nize educational material, and emphasis on the purpose of the publisher
or the recipient cloud and confuse the proper determination of a given
publication's value. Accordingly, any attempt to achieve a judicious
balance between a free press and the right to be let alone would be
well served by discarding these concepts.8 Indeed, the tremendous
variety of fact situations suggests that the test should be broad and
possess a certain flexibility.90
DIMINISHING APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS IN REGULATED INDUSTRY:
CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE AGENCIES
Members of commerce and industry have allegedly been plagued
with uncertainty as to their rights and liabilities under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.1 This obscurity is at times even more prevalent in
segments of the economy which are also subject to regulation by federal
administrative agencies. Whereas the antitrust laws, which remain ap-
plicable in some degree to such industries, forbid restraints of trade by
various types of concerted activity and combinations of ownership which
result in undue economic power,2 several regulatory agencies have, either
89. "To determine in advance of experience the exact line at which the dignity
and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare
would be a difficult fask." Warren and Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214.
90. Implicit in any mechanical consideration of the problems involved is an un-
willingness to examine each case upon its own merits. Or as Mr. Justice Holmes
stated: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases
and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Dissent in Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384, at 391 (1911).
1. See Callman, The Essence of Antitrust, 49 CoL. L. REV. 1100 (1949); Handler,
Anti-trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 REcoRn 59 (1951). But see
Bennett, Some Reflections on the Interpretation of the Sherman Act Since the EvIer-
gency, 8 FED. B.J. 317 (1947).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946). The Clayton Act
was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act by halting practices tending toward re-
straint of trade or commerce. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1946) ; see EULER, MANUAL OF MONOPOLIES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws (1929).
Mere existence of a regulatory statute does not impliedly render inapplicable the
Sherman or Clayton Acts; the antitrust laws are superceded by specific statutes onl3
to the extent of repugnancy between the two. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S,
188, 198-199 (1939). An indictment charging a criminal violation of the antitrust law!
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by the statutes creating them, or by judicial decision, been empowered
to sanction similar practices. The apparent trend toward minimal ap-
plication of antitrust laws in regulated industries is underscored by: (1)
legislative enactments which authorize specified agencies to exempt enum-
erated practices from the operation of antimonopoly laws; (2) judicial
extension to a regulatory body of the power to exempt a particular
course of conduct from the antitrust laws although the exception is not
granted by statute; (3) the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which the
courts apply in order to refer questions requiring utilitization of specific
knowledge to the proper agency for initial consideration.
A pointed illustration of statutory exemption from antitrust laws
is found in the legislation prompted by government proceedings against
railway rate bureaus 3 and the suit in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R.
under the Sherman Act.4 The complaint in the Georgia case charged
a conspiracy among some twenty railroads to restrain trade and com-
merce in violation of the Sherman Act.5 Allegedly, the defendants had
fixed arbitrary and non-competitive rates for freight transportation to
and from Georgia so as to impair the economy of the plaintiff state.
Approximately sixty rate bureaus, committees, conferences and similar
private rate-fixing bodies had been utilized to establish the rates com-
plained of and, according to the plaintiff, no road could change its
joint through-rates without approval of these private rate bureaus.
Southern roads were subject to coercion by northern roads and could not,
even if they so desired, publish joint through-rates between Georgia and
the North when the northern roads would refuse to join in such rates.
As a result of this activity, the rates charged were about 39 percent
higher than the rates for transporting like commodities the same dis-
tances in the North. In the light of cases holding that contracts between
competing roads for the sole purpose of affecting traffic rates,6 and that
combinations which restrict the right of a carrier to set its own rates,7
is generally within the jurisdiction of the court. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry.
& Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105 (1913); United States v. Borden Co., supra. Finally,
rates, although reasonable and non-discriminatory, arrived at through the operations
of a private association of railroads whose purpose was to determine uniform rates
among what would otherwise have been competing carriers, were held subject to criminal
actions brought by the government. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S.
156 (1922) ; but cf. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936).
3. United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb.
1945) ; United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 382 (1912) ; United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
4. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,-2 (1946).
6. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
7. United States v. Northern Securities Co., 120 Fed. 721 (C.C.D. Minn. 1903),
aff'd, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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place a restraint on commerce, the alleged rate-fixing machinery in the
Georgia case was illegal under the Sherman Act.8 Prior to this litigation
the Interstate Commerce Commission had no authority to approve and
legalize the operation of private rate bureaus, but this power was con-
ferred upon the Commission by the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment in
1948. 9
Other instances of litigation evidence the supremacy often accorded
legislative determination of agency objectives over the stated policy of
antitrust laws. In 1929, the ICC approved the acquisition of control
of Railway Express by more than eighty railroads; the Commission
also sanctioned proposed uniform operating agreements calling for a
pooling and division of earnings among the roads, noting that the
agreements would appoint Railway the exclusive agent for conducting
all the express transportation on the lines of the participating roads.' 0
In United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., the complaint was
founded upon the agreements which constituted the defendant the ex-
8. ". . . notwithstanding the important statutory function in the determination of
interstate railroad charges ... of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Sherman Act
applies to interstate common carriers by rail as well as by other means." United States
v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510, 524 (D. Neb. 1945). Price-fixing
under the Sherman Act is illegal per se. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 143 (1948) ; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942).
The opinion in the Georgia case was occasioned by the plaintiff's motion to file an
amended complaint; the motion was granted. The validity of the allegations con-
cerning the activities of the defendant railroads was not determined. The Court, how-
ever, concluded that the complaint stated a cause of action under the antitrust laws,
and if the charges were shown to be true, relief could be granted. Subsequently, a
petition for rehearing was denied, 324 U.S. 890 (1945); a Special Master was ap-
pointed, 326 U.S. 693 (1945); the Special Master's report was received and filed, 339
U.S. 975 (1950); and the Court in a per curiam decision dismissed the amended bill
of complaint, 340 U.S. 889 (1950). The dismissal of the complaint indicates that the
Special Master's report did not find the allegations in the complaint to be true.
9. "Any carrier party to an agreement between or among two or more carriers
relating to rates, [etc.] . . . may . . . apply to the Commission for approval of the
agreement .. " 62 STAT. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. §5b(2) (Supp. 1952). "Parties to
any agreement approved by the Commission under this section . . . are . . . relieved
from the operation of the antitrust laws with respect to the making of such agreement,
and . . . to the carrying out of such agreement .. " 62 STAT. 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C.
§ 5b(9) (Supp. 1952). Utilizing the authority granted it by this Amendment, the ICC
has approved agreements which call for an establishment of an association of carriers
to provide procedures for the joint consideration and initiation of rates by the mem-
bers of the association. Lake Coal Demurrage Committee-Agreement, 279 I.C.C. 40
(1950) ; Eastern Railroads-Agreements, 277 I.C.C. 279 (1950) ; Western Traffic Asso-
ciation, 276 I.C.C. 183 (1949). A similar private rate bureau was sanctioned by the
ICC subject to the condition that the agreement be amended to provide that any
passenger motor carrier should be admitted to membership in the association, as of right,
upon the same terms as existing members. National Bus Traffic Association, Inc.-
Agreement, 278 I.C.C. 147 (1950).
10. Securities and Acquisition of Control of Railway Express Agency, Inc., 150
I.C.C. 423, 429 (1929).
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clusive agent of the railroads and prohibited the roads from engaging
in the express business. 1 The court requested from the ICC a deter-
mination as to whether the Commission, by its approval of the uniform
operating agreements, also approved the exclusive agency provisions. 12
Relying upon ICC determination that the exclusive agency ivas an
essential part of the previously endorsed pooling arrangements, which
were insulated by statute from antitrust authority, the court refused to
invalidate the compacts.
In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
the question was raised concerning the validity of rate schedules pre-
scribed by the FPC which necessitated coordination between Penn Water
and another utility in buying, selling, and transmitting power.' 3 The
Maryland Public Service Commission had asked the FPC to investigate
the excessive rates Penn Water was allegedly charging Consolidated
Gas Co. of Baltimore. After extensive hearings, the FPC found that
Penn Water had charged Consolidated almost three times the amount
that would have constituted a reasonable rate; upon this finding, Penn
Water was ordered to file a new schedule of rates to meet the required
reduction. 14 Subsequently, the FPC denied Penn Water's application for
a rehearing,' 5 rejected new rate schedules filed by the plaintiff, and
prescribed the rate schedules which Penn Water sought to avoid in
court.' 6 The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the FPC to direct
the company to use rate schedules which would necessitate cooperation
with Consolidated,' 7 although Penn Water contended that similar inter-
connection had been held violative of the Sherman Act when arranged
by private contract.' 8 The Court found that Penn Water had been given
a fair hearing on adequate notice, the order was within the authority
11. 101 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Del. 1951).
12. United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1950).
13. 343 U.S. 414 (1952).
14. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 8 F.P.C. 1 (1949).
15. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 8 F.P.C. 170 (1949).
16. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 8 F.P.C. 1193 (1949).
17. "Whenever the Commission . . . finds such action necessary or appropriate
in the public interest it may by order direct a public utility . . . to establish physical
connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of . . . other persons . . .
to sell energy to or exchange energy with such persons. . . . The Commission may
prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement to be made between the persons
affected by any such order.. . ." 49 STAT. 848 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1946).
18. Penn Water had previously sought a declaratory judgment to determine
whether or not certain contractual arrangements between it and Consolidated, calling for
combined operation, were in violation of the antitrust laws. The circuit court reversed
the district court, holding that the contract was invalid as it violated the Sherman Act.
Pennsylvana Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co.,
184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 906 (1950).
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of the FPC, and the Commission acted to further the congressional
purpose articulated in the Federal Power Act.
The Far East Conference, a voluntary organization of water car-
riers engaged in Far East trade, established a dual system of rates,
not approved by the Federal Maritime Board. Shippers who bound
themselves to use only Conference ships paid a rate lower than that
charged shippers who did not so bind themselves. The government
brought an antitrust action against the Conference since the inducement
to exclusive dealing arrangements .here apparently restrained trade.1"
But, because the instant offenses were also violations of the Shipping
Act, for which the FMB could grant an adequate remedy, 20 the Court
in Far East Conference v. United States ruled that the Board had pri-
mary jurisdiction ;21 United States Navigation Co. v. Citnard Steamship
Co. clearly governed the disposition of the present case.22 On the basis
of past FMB decisions, a fair prediction can be made that if a complaint
is presented to the Board, it will issue a cease and desist order against
the Far East Conference and require the Conference to compensate any
water carrier injured as a result of the illegal arrangement. 23
Do these situations exhibit conflict between antitrust law enforce-
ment and regulatory administration, or do the regulatory agencies pro-
tect the public interest by statutory means as vigorously as the antitrust
laws operate in relation to the economy generally? Certainly, the com-
mon purpose is to safeguard the public interest, but the effectiveness
of alternative means to this end may differ. The legislative choice of
the impelling mechanisms should be guided by a realistic appraisal of
particular controls in the fields in which they, are employed.
Statutory Exemptions
Although existence of industry regulation does not create an auto-
matic exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws, 24 certain
19. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). "It may be con-
ceded that looking alone to the Sherman Anti-trust Act the bill states a cause of
action .. " United States Navigation -Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474,
480 (1932).
20. "No common carrier by water shall . . . [r]etaliate against any shipper by
• . . resort to . . . discriminating or unfair methods, because such shipper has
patronized any other carrier. . . ." 39 STAT. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §812
(1946). ". . . the Board . . . may direct the payment . . . of full reparation to the
complainant for the injury caused by such violation." 39 STAT. 736 (1916), as amended,
46 U.S.C. § 821 (Supp. 1952).
21. 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
22. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
23. See note 39 infra, and accompanying text.
24. In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co., 184 F.2d 552, 560 (4th Cir. 1950), the question of antitrust enforcement in
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acts can be perpetrated by the members of a regulated industry with
immunity from liability under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, at least
if statutory prerequisites are met. Notable among these exempting
clauses are those in the Interstate Commerce Act, Shipping Act, Civil
Aeronautics Act, and Federal Communications Act.
The ICC may approve a division of traffic or earnings if such a
division "will be in the interest of better service to the public or of
economy in operation, and will not unduly restrain competition."2 5 The
Commission may approve acquisition of one carrier by another if it
finds the consolidation to be in the public interest. 26 If the Commission
finds an agreement between carriers to establish rates is in "furtherance
of the national transportation policy," it may approve such agree-
ment.2 7  The FMB may sanction contracts and arrangements between
water carriers "fixing or regulating transportation rates; giving or re-
ceiving special rates; . . . controlling, regulating, preventing, or de-
stroying competition; . . . or in any manner providing for an exclusive,
preferential, or cooperative arrangement," which the Board finds not
to be "unjustly discriminatory . . . as between carriers, shippers," and
others, "or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United
States .... *"28 The CAB may approve any merger between air carriers
which it finds is not inconsistent with the public interest. The Board
cannot, however, sanction any consolidation "which could result in cre-
ating a monopoly . . . and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize
another air carrier not a party to the . . . merger .... -29 Similarly,
the FCC may approve the consolidation of domestic telegraph carriers
if the Commission finds such consolidation to be in the public interest. 30
The agreements or practices authorized by the foregoing agencies in
accordance with the statutes are exempted from the provisions of the
antitrust laws which would otherwise make them illegal. 31 This relief
regulated industry is briefly summarized: "... the grant of monopolistic privileges,
subject to regulation by governmental body, does not carry an exemption, unless one be
expressly granted, from the anti-trust laws, or deprive the courts of jurisdiction to
enforce them."
25. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (Supp. 1952).
26. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (b) (Supp. 1952).
27. 62 STAT. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b (2) (Supp. 1952).
28. 39 STAT. 734 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. 1952).
29. 52 STAT. 1001 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 488 (1946).
30. 57 STAT. 6 (1943), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 222(b) (1) (Supp. 1952).
31. ICC--"The carriers affected by any order . . . to effect a consolidation
approved and authorized in such order . . . are . . . relieved from the operation of the
'antitrust' laws. . . ." 41 STAT. 482 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(8) (1946) ; and
see 62 STAT. 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (Supp. 1952), pertaining to relief from
liability for rate-making agreements. FMB--"Every agreement . . . lawful under
this section shall be excepted from the provisions of sections 1-11 and 15 of Title
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applies only to the specifically defined acts and must be secured in the
exact manner set forth by the statute. 32
Since Congress has excused certain behavior in regulated industry
from the operation of the antitrust laws when suitably sanctioned, con-
sideration of the background of these exemptions is necessary to dis-
cover, if possible, the legislative purpose in enacting the exceptions. The
Sherman and Clayton Acts are an attempt to keep competition relatively
free from interference to the end that prices and business practices may
be determined by the operation of a free market. 33  Regulation of a
specific industry exhibits a congressional recognition that competition
by itself protects the public only to the extent that a free market is
actually advantageous; commercial rivalry fails as a protector of the
public where the general welfare of the country is harmed-3 4-for ex-
ample, by cut-throat competition. In determining policy affecting com-
merce and industry, legislators have been faced continually with the
issue of whether competition or regulation is economically more desir-
able, and, which system offers the greater protection to the public interest.
Congressional provisions for exemptions from antitrust law in
regulated industry may bespeak an intent to depend upon competent
administrative bodies to enforce the basic rationale of the antimonopoly
legislation, or, such exceptions could indicate an intent to abandon the
philosophy of the antitrust laws in such industries. The former seems
15. . . ." 39 STAT. 734 (1916), as amended, 49 STAT. 2016 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1946).
CAB--"Any person affected by any order made under sections . . . shall be . . .
relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws' . . . insofar as may be necessary
to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order."
52 STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §494 (1946). FCC-". . . the Commission shall
enter an order approving . . . such consolidation . . . and thereupon any . .. laws
making consolidations . . . unlawful shall not apply .... ." 57 STAT. 7 (1943), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §222(c)(1) (1946); and see 57 STAT. 6 (1943), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 222(b) (1) (1946).
32. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940); 40
Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 338 (1944).
33. Acknowledging the non-existence in the economy of a literally free market
governed by pure competition as defined by economists, the term "free market" is here
used as employed in H.R. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1950): "The
American system is based on the maintenance of a free market wherein the products
of farm and factory are offered for sale in competition which insures the movement of
the greatest quantity of goods at the lowest possible price." For an enlightening dis-
cussion of the varying degrees of market freedom existing in the national economy
today, see WILcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1-18 (TNEC
Monograph 21, 1941).
34. "It [Federal Power Act] evidences congressional recognition that competition
can assure protection of the public interest only in an industrial setting which is
conducive to a free market and can have no place in industries which are monopolies
because of public grant, the exigencies of nature, or legislative preference for a par-
ticular way of doing business." Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 193 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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more likely where Congress has included express standards for granting
immunity which, of necessity, call for a reconciliation between the anti-
trust policy and the concepts of regulation ;35 the latter intention seems
more plausible in statutes placing no restriction other than the public
interest upon the power to grant absolution. 36 Notwithstanding the pos-
sibility of legislative displacement of antitrust policy in these latter in-
stances, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States, expressed the view that the public interest embraced a
substantial consideration of the antitrust laws. 37  And, the Supreme
Court has accepted the proposition that the FCC should administer its
duties always aware of the aim expressed in the passage of the Sherman
Act.38
35. See notes 25, 27, 28, 29 supra.
36. See notes 26, 30 supra.
37. 321 U.S. 67, 93 (1944). In 1941, Associated Transport, Inc., was incorporated
so as to effect the consolidation of eight large motor carriers. The corporation applied
to the ICC for approval of the merger. Opposition to the consolidation was presented
in ICC hearings by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the National Grange, four fruit growers' associations, and a motor
carrier. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Commission authorized the merger. As-
sociated Transport, Inc.-Control and Consolidation, 38 M.C.C. 137 (1942). The McLean
Trucking Co., a competitor of some of the carriers who were parties to the merger,
brought suit to set aside the Commission's order; the district court dismissed the com-
plaint. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). On
appeal, the principal issues were whether the ICC applied the proper standard in granting
approval, and whether the Commission gave due weight to the antitrust policy. The
Court affirmed the lower court decision.
Mr. Justice Douglas felt the ICC should only authorize an agreement which would
violate the antitrust laws if it were not approved by the Commission, in situations where
no other method for furthering the policy prescribed for the ICC by Congress was
presented. In evaluating Mr. Justice Douglas' contention in his dissent that antitrust
policy is strongly embodied in "public interest, "the reader should bear in mind the
fact that Douglas has consistently favored strictest enforcement and application of the
antitrust laws. See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissents in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
343 U.S. 414 (1952) ; Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) ; and
see Epstein, Economic Predileetions of Justice Douglas, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 531, 556.
38. The Supreme Court, in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190 (1943), approved the report of the FCC as to 'the agency's function in balancing
the antitrust policy against that of regulation. At page 223, the Court quoted the Com-
mission s self-determination of its regulatory duties: "This Commission, although not
charged with the duty of enforcing that law [Sherman Act] should administer its
regulatory powers . . . in the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was
designed to achieve. .. ." See the discussion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Radio
Corporation of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951) (dubitante). But cf.
RCA Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 21 U.S.L. WEr 2217
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 11, 1952), in which the majority opinion concluded the Communications
Act was not intended to promote competition but was for the purpose of permitting
entry into the field of only those who can prove that such entry would serve the public
interest. This opinion was in contrast to the Commission's conclusion that the proposed
service should be authorized, in that it would do the public no good, but little harm,
and would promote competition. Judge Prettyman dissented, saying the mere fact that
a development would foster competition does not prove that such practices are not in
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Assuming the sufficiency of the statutory guides, are administrative
agencies observing and giving due deference to them? A cursory exam-
ination reveals that administrative bodies usually articulate the conclusion
that a particular practice has been found to conform to the legislative
standards prescribed for the agency to follow; the conduct should there-
fore be granted agency approval.3 9 Critical appraisal of agency operation
by experts has resulted in vigorous criticism of the manner in which
the statutory standards are applied by the administrative bodies.4 0
Agency findings usually come after extensive hearings and are accom-
panied by voluminous detailed opinions. A reader of these reports is
frequently unable to ascertain whether the stated facts actually prove
that the statutory standards have been met, since the opinions necessarily
adduce mainly the circumstances which support the stated conclusion.4 1
Although a court has access to the entire record, as well as the agency's
report, and is presented various guides, such as parties' briefs, to aid it
in grasping and evaluating the facts, it is not unreasonable to assume
the public interest; he believed the agency's approval of the proposed service should
have been affirmed.
39. FCC-e.g., Mutual Telehone Co., 12 F.C.C. 875 (1949); Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 12 F.C.C. 1010 (1948); Southeastern Massachusetts Broadcasting Corp., 12
F.C.C. 363 (1947) ; Providence Journal Co., 12 F.C.C. 267 (1947) ; Sherwood B. Brun-
ton, 11 F.C.C. 407 (1946) ; Julio M. Conesa, 11 F.C.C. 200 (1946). FPC-e.g., Atlantic
City Electric Co., 8 F.P.C. 949 (1949); Carolina Power & Light Co., 8 F.P.C. 829
(1949); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 6 F.P.C. 1114 (1947); The Connecticut
Power Co., 6 F.P.C. 451 (1947); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 4 F.P.C. 948 (1945);
California Public Service Co., 4 F.P.C. 812 (1944); Public Service Electric & Gas
Co., 1 F.P.C. 748 (1938); Newport Electric Corp., 1 F.P.C. 699 (1937). FMB-e.g.,
Black Diamond Steamship Corp., 2 U.S.M.C. 755 (1946); Rates From Japan To
United States, 2 U.S.M.C. 426 (1940); Waterman Steamship Corp., 2 U.S.M.C. 238
(1939); Storage Charges Under Agreements, 1 U.S.M.C. 750 (1938); Philadelphia
Ocean Traffic Bureau, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 538 (1936); Port Differential Investigation, 1
U.S.S.B. 61 (1925). ICC-e.g., Lumber From And To Hampton & Branchville RR.t,
264 I.C.C. 419 (1946) ; Consolidation Of Railroads, 235 I.C.C. 1 (1939) ; Operation By
Manufacturers Railway Co., 145 I.C.C. 715 (1928); Acquisition Of Control By Cen-
tral R.R., 145 I.C.C. 279 (1928). CAB-e.g., Air Freight Forwarders Case, 9 C.A.B.
473 (1948); American Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 371 (1945); Pan American Airways,
Inc., 6 C.A.B. 143 (1944); Pan American Airways, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 540 (1942); Pan
American Airways, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 32 (1941) ; United Air Lines Transport Corp., 1
C.A.B. 739 (1940).
40. See Durham and Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the
Air Freight Industry, 34 VA. L. REv. 769 (1948); Huntington, The Marasminus of the
ICC: The Commission, The Railroads, and The Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467
(1952); Warner, The Administrative Process of the Federal Communications Conr-
mission, 19 So. CAL. L. REv. 312 (1946) ; Notes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 947 (1951) ; 64 HAiv.
L. REv. 1154 (1951) ; but see Smith, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries, 14 I.C.C.P. JOURNAL 181 (1946); Stough, Origination and Procedures of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, 11 I.C.C.P. JOURNAL 372 (1944).
41. Judge Frank has said that a judicial opinion "is a censared exposition, written
by a judge, of what induced him to arrive at a decision which he has already reached."
Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School, 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 907, 911 (1933).
This statement would be equally applicable to administrative determinations.
NOTES
that a court also encounters great difficulties in attempting to ascertain
whether the conclusion necessarily follows from the evidence.42
The Sherman Act was designed to protect interstate and foreign
commerce from unlawful restraints of trade and monopolies; the Clayton
Act was passed with the goal of insuring there would be no lessening
of competition in interstate commerce resulting from harmful practices.
Administrative agencies, on the other hand, were created because Con-
gress felt a need for the substitution of regulation for competition in
certain areas to improve the performance of the industrial and com-
mercial machinery of that segment of the economy.
If administrative agencies were nonexistent, Congress would be
forced to legislate with a view to correcting evils already present.43
Admittedly, this is the usual method of congressional action, but, if
the legislature must wait until detrimental practices in an industry vital
to the national economy become manifest, corrective measures may come
too late to prevent severe injury to the economy. Creation of an agency
to supervise the field permits preventive measures to impede a harmful
course of conduct. Congress was also aware of its own limitations in
regard to certain questions requiring expertise and specialization for
intelligent evaluation and solution, and so created administrative agencies
embodying the requisite knowledge found wanting in Congress. Since
the legislature intended to replace competition with regulation in speci-
fied areas, ostensibly, the antitrust laws should not apply with full force
and vigor to regulated industries.
The antitrust laws and the doctrine of illegality per se" only con-
sider the public interest in so far as it is supposedly served by the strict
enforcement of antimonopoly legislation. An agency, on the other hand,
has the advantage of continuity of attention and clearly stated responsi-
bilities for the public interest in its empowering act. It is not impossible
to conceive of practices beneficial to the public and, yet, in opposition
42. The Court, recognizing its own shortcomings in accurately and justly de-
termining technical questions, such as rates, has paid due deference to administrative
bodies. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944),
climaxed a series of disputes which struggled with the problem of judicial review of
agency rate-fixing to determine the .reasonableness of such rates: See Chicago, M. &
St. P. R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (rates must be fair and not confiscatory) ;
Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (reasonable return on the
investment); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (formula set up to evaluate the
investment to ascertain reasonable return).
43. See REP. Avr'y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 13 (1941).
44. See Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent
Misuse, 50 CoL. L. REv. 170 (1950); and ANTITRUST LAW SYmPosIum 20 (1950 ed.)
for a thorough treatment of the increasing use of the illegality per se doctrine in anti-
trust cases.
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to the antitrust philosophy; indeed, Congress has perceived such instances
and provided for specific exemption of these acts from prosecution under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Exemption by Judicial Decision
Although Congress has evidenced an intent to allow certain regula-
tory agencies to operate in segments of the economy without necessarily
following the antitrust laws, it has not seen fit to extend such authority
to all regulatory administrative agencies. Whatever the congressional
purpose, the fact is that only four major agencies were granted power to
absolve practices from the operation of the antitrust laws; the FPC is
not among them. In the Penn Water case, an order of the FPC was
contested on the ground that compliance with its directive would force
the company to violate the Sherman Act.4 5 In upholding the order, the
Supreme Court said: "The duty of Penn Water to continue its coordin-
ated operations with Consolidated springs from the Commission's au-
thority, not from the law of private contracts," and, "[i]n the highly
unlikely event that Penn Water's managerial freedom is ever threatened
by such an order, it will be time enough to consider its validity. ' 40
Could the Justice Department successfully prosecute an action in
this situation? If so, would the fact that the utility was acting under a
Commission order be a complete defense? The Court implied there would
be no antitrust proceedings instituted against Penn Water based on the
present arrangement; whether this assumption is founded upon the con-
clusion that the FPC order calls for cooperation between the two com-
panies sufficiently different from prior illegal coordination, or on the
rationale that has led to congressional grants of this type of power to
agencies, is speculative. Whatever may have motivated the Court, a
possibility arises that conduct sanctioned by an agency may be exempted
from the antitrust law by a court, absent specific authorization by Con-
gress. Congress has limited exception clauses to specific agencies, and
this power of exemption should not be extended other than by legis-
lative enactment.
Primary Jurisdiction
Theoretically, the right of persons to bring proceedings under the
antitrust laws against a member of a regulated industry is not abrogated
merely because the industry is subject to regulation. The doctrine of
45. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 343 U.S. 414
(1952) ; see notes 13-18 supra, and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 421-422.
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primary jurisdiction, however, is pertinent in this situation. This doc-
trine originated in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.4 7
Abilene sued to recover damages, alleging the carrier had exacted an
unjust and unreasonable rate for a shipment of cotton seed from Lou-
isiana to Texas. The rates charged were covered by the Interstate Com-
merce Act, which provided that a person claiming to be damaged by
a carrier under the provisions of the Act might bring an action either in
the district court or before the ICC.4s The defendant asserted that since
the contested rate had been filed with the ICC, the court was without
jurisdiction to question it, or that, if the court had jurisdiction, it could
not grant relief from a rate which had not been found to be unreason-
able by the Commission. Finding that judicial determination of the
question of the reasonableness of the rate would defeat one of the pur-
poses of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was to establish uniformity
and equality of rates, the Court concluded the Act required that the
question of reasonableness must be originally resolved by the ICC, and,
hence, Abilene must seek redress by primary resort to the Commission.
In applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts have
evolved the general thesis that questions which fall peculiarly within an
agency's competence are not subject initially to determination by a
court.49 When an agency has authority to grant a remedy for a com-
plaint, primary resort should be made to the agency; if the issue is
entirely outside the agency's authority, the courts will retain jurisdic-
tion." In addition, primary resort to an agency is not essential to
support the jurisdiction of the courts over cases involving questions
within the dominion of the agency, but where the controversy is not
over a question of fact and there is no occasion for the exercise of
administrative discretion.51 The doctrine is generally inapplicable to
criminal antitrust actions. 2  Primary jurisdiction precisely effectuates
the overall congressional intent regarding the role of administrative
agencies.
47. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
48. 24 STAT. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1946).
49. "And whatever may be the form of the agreement, and whether it be lawful
or unlawful upon its face, Congress undoubtedly intended that the board should possess
the authority primarily to hear and adjudge the matter." United States Navigation Co.
v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 487 (1932); accord, Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S.
156, 164 (1922).
50. E.g., Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Gulf, C. & S.F. R.R., 270 U.S. 266 (1925);
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Modern Air Transport, 179 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1950);
Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951).
51. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
52. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 206 (1939).
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Dismissal of a court proceeding is not a necessary consequence of
the use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The court may retain juris-
diction of the cause, pending agency determination of the administra-
tive questions.5 3 This course will usually be followed if the case presents
questions which necessitate a conclusion by the agency as to whether
any aspect of the alleged offenses falls within the agency's authority.
54
The complaint will be dismissed by the court only if the disputes are
entirely within the scope of the agency's dominion. 55 As a practical
matter, then, the ultimate result will probably be indicated by the
agency. 56
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co. typifies the
operation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 57 Navigation Co. was
operating steamships carrying general cargo between New York City
and foreign ports. Cunard was engaged in foreign commerce and car-
ried 95 percent of the general cargo trade from North Atlantic ports
in the United States to ports in Great Britain and Ireland. Navigation
and Cunard were the only general cargo carriers supplying this area.
The defendant, Cunard, had established a dual system of rates, a general
tariff and a lower contract rate; the latter was made available only to
shippers who shipped exclusively with the defendant. In numerous
instances the tariff rate was 100 percent higher than the contract rate.
This scheme was resorted to by Cunard for the purpose of coercing ship-
pers to deal solely with the defendant and thereby to necessitate the
plaintiff's withdrawal from competition with the defendant. Cunard
was also alleged to have given rebates and employed other illegal prac-
tices to the end of forcing Navigation to withdraw from the general
cargo carrying business in this area. Plaintiff brought action to enjoin
53. "For the purpose of deciding the case on the merits, however, the case must
first be referred to the . . . Commission for a finding as to the proper rental charge-
able for tank cars furnished by non-shippers .... The measure of damages . . . if
any . . . depends wholly on the Commission's findings with respect to tank car rentals."
Keith Railway Equipment Co. v. Association of American Railroads, 64 F. Supp. 917,
921 (N.D. 1ll. 1946).
54. Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F. Supp.
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); S. S. W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952). Also see note 64 infra, and accompanying text.
55. Slick Airways v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951).
Also see note 61 infra.
56. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). This may
involve -application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Berger,
Exhastion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); Davis, Adinstra-
tive Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary
Jurisdiction, 28 TEx. L. REv. 168 (1949); DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 182-196
(1951).
57. 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
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Cunard from continuing its practices. Here, as was conceded by the
Court, violations of the antitrust laws were clearly present, but the
alleged offenses were also infractions of the Shipping Act. The remedy,
then, was that afforded by the FMB under the latter Act since the
matter was entirely within the Board's primary jurisdiction. The recent
holding in the Far East Conference case adopts the same conclusion in
a proceeding brought by the government."8
Two recent decisions pertaining to the CAB indicate a conflict in
delineating the effective scope of primary jurisdiction. In Slick Airways
v. American Airlines, Inc., both plaintiff and defendant were engaged
in the air transportation business.59 Slick sued for triple damages
amounting to ten million dollars and to enjoin further action by the
defendant in violation of the antitrust laws.60 The complaint alleged
that American and other airlines conspired to monopolize the air trans-
portation business and to restrain trade and commerce by utilizing "pred-
atory rate policies and a process of attrition to waste the resources of the
plaintiff . . . and . . . cause them to operate at a substantial loss."
In addition, the defendant was charged with waging "a campaign of
unfair competitive practices designed to appropriate the [air trans-
portation] business." Basing its contention upon the primary jurisdiction
of the CAB, American claimed the court was without jurisdiction to
hear this case. The district court concluded that since alleged violations
of the antitrust laws could not be dealt with by the CAB, the court had
jurisdiction. 1
58. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). See notes 19, 20
supra. A district court has expressed the view that ". . . where an antitrust proceeding
is brought by the Government . .. civil or criminal, the . . . court has .. .plenary
jurisdiction, even though there are issues in the case which may involve what are
broadly termed administrative questions." United States v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 89 F. Supp. 981, 986 (D. Del. 1950). The Far East Conference case overrules
this determination: "The same considerations of administrative expertise apply, ewhoever
initiates the action." Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576 (1952).
59. 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951).
60. "Any person who shall be injured in his business .. .by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore .. . and shall recover threefold the
damages -by him sustained. . . ." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946).
61. The court observed that the CAB is not empowered to award damages for a
violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The CAB could prevent present and future
infractions by issuing a cease and desist order; it could not give a remedy for past
offenses. Upon this ground, the court distinguished CAB cases from those concerning
the antitrust laws and the FMB. The latter agency has power to allow monetary damages
for alleged grievances resulting from practices in violation of the Shipping Act. Since
there is no repugnancy between the Sherman Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act, the
former is not impliedly repealed by the latter. Further, the court did not feel the
matter presented administrative questions such as must be determined by the CAB.
Consequently, it did not order a stay of proceedings pending CAB resolution of admin-
istrative problems.
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In a similar case, S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Association, the
plaintiff, a "nonscheduled" air carrier, sued Air Transport, an associa-
tion of regularly certificated air carriers, for treble damages and to
enjoin defendants from continuing an alleged combination in restraint
of trade.62 The plaintiff accused the defendants of conspiring to monop-
olize air commerce and of employing various wrongful methods to
achieve their end. The principal allegations charged Air Transport with
coercing ticket agencies to refrain from becoming agents for the plain-
tiff, influencing administrative agencies to impose regulations which
favored the certificated carriers and proved burdensome for the "non-
scheds," and offering transportation at cut prices until competition was
eliminated. These offenses also constituted violations of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act.63 The district court had denied relief on the ground that
the complaint raised matters which the Civil Aeronautics Act was de-
signed to correct and which fell within the primary jurisdiction of the
CAB. 64 The circuit court referred the part of the complaint asking for
injunctive relief to the CAB, since the Board could grant that remedy.
The portion of the complaint charging antitrust violations and seeking
treble damages was remanded to the district court to retain jurisdiction
of the antitrust suit while the plaintiff sought his remedies from the
CAB. If the Board found the matter to be within its jurisdiction and
the alleged practices legal under the Civil Aeronautics Act, there could
be no antitrust violation.65 The court and agency were thus made coop-
erative instrumentalities for the dispensation of justice.60
Conclusions and Suggestions
There may be a danger that limitation of the applicability of the
antitrust laws, while full scope is given to the authority of the admin-
62. 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952).
63. "The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any carrier
... investigate and determine whether any carrier . . . has been engaged in . . . unfair
methods of competition in air transportation. If the Board shall find . . . that such
air carrier . . . is engaged in . . . unfair methods of competition, it shall order such
air carrier . . . to cease and desist from such . . . methods of competition." 52 STAT.
1003 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 491 (1946).
64. S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n, 91 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1950).
65. "The proceedings before the Board will result in a determination by it of
the extent of its jurisdiction over the subject matter. In addition, they will produce a
record, findings of fact and conclusions of law .... The District Court, which will
• . . have retained jurisdiction of the antitrust suit, will have the benefit of these
proceedings in determining the issue of antitrust violation." S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Trans-
port Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952);
accord Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F. Supp.
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
66. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S.
246, 264 (1951); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
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istrative agencies, may result in allowing the regulated industries to
shape the controls which supposedly limit them. Some commentators
believe that as the extent of government supervision increases, the regu-
latory authorities become industry-oriented and fail to protect the pub-
lic;67 writers have pointed to the ICC as an example of an industry-
oriented agency which has lost its effectiveness to defend shippers and
consumers against abuses by the carriers. 6 If such criticism is valid,
what check is there on administrative bodies? Aside from political re-
straints, one answer obviously lies in judicial review. All agency em-
powering acts and the Administrative Procedure Act provide for judicial
review of agency action. 9 However, judicial review of agency direc-
tives, as it functions today, is hardly an adequate safeguard against
capricious and arbitrary determination by agencies.
70
In order to assure the proper application of the guiding principles
in the empowering acts of the various agencies, reliance must be placed
upon a factor other than judicial review, especially since a reviewing
court cannot compel an agency to exercise its given authority.71 Criti-
cism of administrative bodies has been directed at the personnel and
actual operation of the agencies, rather than at the existence of agencies
per se.7 2  Selection of competent administrators is the most effective
safeguard against abuses of power and to a considerable extent assures
compliance with congressional policies expressed in the creation of the
67. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CompEnioN 251 (1st ed. 1949).
68. E.g., Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads,
and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1951).
69. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1946) (Administrative Procedure Act); 52
STAT. 1024 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §646 (1946) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 48
STAT. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (Supp. 1952) (Federal Communi-
cations Commission) ; 39 STAT. 738 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 830 (1946) (Fed-
eral Maritime Board) ; 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 825(l) (1946) (Federal Power
Commission); 24 STAT. 385 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 17(9) (1946) (Interstate
Commerce Commission).
70. Extensive treatment has been accorded the scope and effect of judicial review
upon administrative determinations in other discussions. E.g., DAVIs, ADMINISTRTIVE
LAW §§ 210-257 (1951); DICIcrsoN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW (1927); LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123 (1938); Daily, Practical
Value of an Appeal Under Section 1006(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. AIR
L. 365 (1948); Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action,
49 COL. L. REv. 759 (1949); de Smith, The Limits of Judicial Review: Statutory
Discretions and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 11 MoD. L. REv. 306 (1948); Dickinson,
Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33
A.B.A.J. 434 (1947): Dickinson, Review of Administrative Determination, A Summary
and Evaluation, 25 MINN. L. REV. 588 (1941); McCarran, Improving "Administrative
Justice": Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827 (1946).
71. See REP. ATr'y GEN. CoMma. AD., PRoC. 76 (1941).
72. See notes 40 and 68 supra.
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agencies; a conscientious and intelligent choice of commissioners should
alleviate the danger of agencies becoming industry-oriented. The heyday
of the ICC73 and the recent disposal of government-owned wartime
aluminum plants74 illustrate the accomplishments of responsible .admin-
istration.
While capable personnel is of prime importance, adequacy of ap-
propriations is equally significant; an inadequate staff coupled with too
limited access to funds can result in the deterioration of any govern-
mental body. Agencies must not be treated as a minor component of
the American economic system, but. should be established in the position
they were intended to occupy-leading elements of the economy.
There is, however, need for improvement in the structure of the
administrative, agencies. As such agencies operate, each is an inde-
pendent entity with little or no correlation or coordination with other
regulatory bodies. Much can be said for individuality; considerable
advantages, however, can be gained from a program of cooperation
among the independent agencies. Formation of a Commission for Co-
ordination of Regulatory Agencies bespeaks recognition of the faults
of the subsistent scheme and proffers correction of them.75 Unquestion-
ably, opposition to the creation of one more bureau would arise in many
quarters. Such resistance could point to inefficiency in agencies presently
73. Huntington, supra note 68.
74. United States wartime aluminum plants were to be sold to private owners. The
administrators of the operation could not strengthen monopolies by such disposal as they
might make of these plants under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 STAT. 765
(1944). In the words of the statute: "The Congress hereby declares that the objective,
of this Act are to facilitate and regulate the orderly disposal of surplus property so a!
... (d) to discourage monopolistic practices and to strengthen and preserve the com-
petitive position. . . ." 58 STAT. 766 (1944). The board, acting under this statutor3
obligation, not only disposed of the plants, but actually promoted competition by en-
ticing two new competitors to enter the field, making a total of three where previousl3
there had been only one-the Aluminum Company of America. For an excellent repori
of this undertaking, see STEIN, THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALUMINUM PLANTS (Comm. or
Pub. Adm'n Cases 1948).
75. The structure of the central authority would follow the pattern established b3
present administrative boards. The central control would be exercised by seven commis-
sioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Com-
mission would include a chairman, general secretary, general counsel, general engineer
general accountant, general economist, the Attorney General, and assistants to each oi
these. The authority would be able to employ such other personnel as necessary to th(
effective exercise of its function. None of the commissioners, officers, or assistant,
should be members of present regulatory agencies.
Although it would be virtually impossible to find men who are experts in all field!
of regulation, the technical make-up of the central authority would guarantee intelligen
evaluation of the reports submitted by the lower agencies. This thesis would be equall]
applicable whether the report came before the central authority in an action appealinl
a lower agency directive, or on initial inquiry by the central board.
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in operation as illustrative of the evils incident to expanding govern-
mental regulation. But, creation of another bureau to enhance the
proper administration of existing agencies should not fail because of such
analogies. General principles of control, and skills applicable to all agen-
cies, could be elicited and employed to increase the efficient management
of each in the exercise of its duty.70
Upon acknowledging the desirability of establishing a central au-
thority, the amount of power to be vested in it becomes a paramount
concern. Fearing the possibility of centralization of control over the
entire economy in the hands of one agency, writers have advocated
restricting the central authority to an advisory position 77---making rec-
ommendations to the lower agencies on overall economic policies and
supplying Congress with reports concerning the competency of the vari-
ous agencies, as well as submitting recommendations to the legislature
for increasing their effective operation. Notwithstanding the admittedly
favorable results to be gained from a purely advisory authority, greater
advantages are promised by the establishment of a commission which,
in addition to its other functions, would also be empowered to review
lower agencies' determinations and to compel them to exercise their
granted powers.
Since members of the Commission would not be dealing exclusively
with the problems and personnel of one particular field, there would be
little possibility that the Commission's directives would further the inter-
ests of the members of one regulated industry in opposition to the gen-
eral welfare of the public. In sum, the Commission could provide a
check on industry-orientation, a source of counsel for, and a coordinat-
ing factor between, the agencies, as well as an impetus to more consci-
entious exercise of the agencies' granted powers.
Nevertheless, as Edwards has said, "[i] f competition is abandoned
more widely than control is applied, there will be a no man's land of
business activity in which the public interest is safeguarded by neither
competition nor control."78 Avoidance of this lacuna requires some plan
to assimilate the conflicting policies of competition and regulation. The
Attorney General, or one of his staff, should be a member of the Com-
mission; his advice would be of singular value regarding the effect of
the antitrust laws on proposed practices, particularly in areas where
76. Edwards, op. cit. supra note 67, at 274.
77. E.g., Fuchs, Current Proposals for the Reorganization of the Federal Regulatory
Agencies, 16 TEx. L. REv. 335 (1938).
78. Edwards, op. cit. supra note 67, at 259.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
restraint of monopolies is part of the agency's statutory obligation or
the public interest is not included in the agency's standard.79
If the nation continues to rely upon administrative agencies as
the custodians of the public interest in some areas, the protectors must
be energized to better enable them to adequately fulfill their designated
function. Since existing supervisory agencies manifest a need for in-
creased adjustment between the policies of regulation and competition,
creation of a Commission for Coordination of Regulatory Agencies is
indeed warranted. The end result of statutory evolution in this area
should be effective protection of the public, whether by regulatory acts
or by the antitrust laws. Where supervision is not complete, there is
a role for commercial rivalry to play. Once complete regulation has
been chosen, however, no room remains for the conflicting concept of
promoting competition.
STATE TAXATION OF VEHICLES MOVING
INTERSTATE: THE INTERVENTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT
In their widening search for sources of revenue the states find
themselves subject to control by courts acting under various clauses of
the federal Constitution. The taxpayer, on the other hand, finds the
Constitution and the courts a sometime protection against what may
seem to him the depredations of money-hungry state legislatures and
tax administrators. The commercial enterprise which operates in more
than one state is in the fortunate position of having two constitutional
shields in its armory which are granted to few other taxpayers-the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause.
The mandate of the due process clause with respect to state taxes
is that a tax "bear fiscal relation to the protection, opportunities, and
benefits given by the state."' Despite difference of opinion among
members of the present Supreme Court regarding applications of this
test,2 the basic criterion has not been challenged. The commerce clause
79. "Officials of the government are aware of and, for the most part, responsive
to their duty to respect the laws of the United States and to conform to its policies.
Hence they are likely to keep their actions reasonably consistent with the competitive
policy in so far as they have it in mind." Id. at 310.
1. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
2. See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in State Tax Commissioner v. Aldrich, 316
